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Financial regulation in the post-crisis environment 
by Douglas D. Evanoff, vice president and senior financial economist, and William F. Moeller, associate economist
The Chicago Fed’s 46th annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition,  
which took place May 5–7, 2010, focused on the future of the financial services  
industry in light of the recent financial crisis and forthcoming industry reforms.
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More information on the 
conference is available  
at www.chicagofed.org/ 
webpages/events/2010/bank_
structure_conference.cfm.growth of securitization; large banks 
had greater access to securitized markets 
and were therefore able to underprice 
loan originations and make up for their 
underpricing through sales of the loans 
into the secondary market. 
Corporate debt markets deteriorated 
severely during the recent crisis, but have 
recovered over the past year as credit 
spreads have narrowed to pre-crisis levels. 
Concurrently, securitization markets 
collapsed, leading to a sharp decline in 
consumer and small business loans; 
banks simply did not have room for new 
originations. With inadequate access to 
credit, small businesses could not expand 
and hire, Whitney said. Since 42% of U.S. 
employment comes from small business-
es, she added, this represents a signifi-
cant drag on the recovery. Therefore, the 
structure of the financial system can  
affect the real economy. Whitney argued 
that the banking system should shift back 
to a model of regionalized lending. 
Lenders need to know their borrowers, 
she noted, because “the highest corre-
lation of loss to a loan is distance.” 
Kroszner said that the goal of financial 
regulatory reform should be to create 
a stable financial system that supports 
sustainable economic growth. Many  
research studies suggest that a “deeper 
and more developed” financial system 
enhances economic growth, he noted. 
However, he said the recent financial cri-
sis shows that there might be a trade-off 
with volatility. Regulatory reform should 
focus on how to minimize extreme events 
without hindering aspects of the system 
that drive economic growth. 
Kroszner argued that the recent crisis 
revealed fragilities with the infrastructure 
of the financial system. He noted that 
many institutions were highly levered 
and relied excessively on short-term repo 
market funding. As uncertainty grew 
about the quality of firms’ balance sheets, 
markets became illiquid and there were 
funding runs on SIFIs. Amid uncertainty 
around bankruptcy proceedings, a panic 
ensued. These events revealed a growing 
interconnectedness within the financial 
network through counterparty and 
funding chain linkages.
Regulators and market participants need 
assurance that the financial system will 
not collapse if a significant institution 
fails, Kroszner said. To accomplish this, 
he argued that financial reform should 
address not only failure prevention 
but also the robustness of market infra-
structure. Toward this goal, and to  
improve transparency and reduce in-
terconnections, OTC derivatives should 
be placed onto a central clearinghouse 
platform and structured products (e.g., 
mortgage-backed securities) should be 
subjected to basic underwriting stan-
dards. He also suggested implementing 
countercyclical capital requirements 
that make banks set aside more capital 
in good times to protect the firms in 
downturns. This could help smooth  
cycles in both financial markets and 
the broader economy. However, he 
warned of the unintended consequences 
of simply raising capital requirements; 
higher requirements might encourage 
banks to shift their portfolios toward 
riskier and less transparent activities. 
Finally, new resolution processes for 
BHCs and nonbank financial institu-
tions must be spelled out clearly to 
avoid creating greater uncertainty for 
bankruptcy proceedings and significant 
moral hazard. 
Parkinson contended that legislation 
should extend supervision and regula-
tion to all firms that pose a systemic 
threat. In addition to providing greater 
oversight, financial reforms must increase 
reliance on market discipline. Accord-
ingly, he argued that the government 
should be empowered with resolution 
authority to help avoid the disorderly 
failure of SIFIs, but only if it is willing 
to impose meaningful losses on creditors. 
Otherwise, it could exacerbate the  
dilemma of moral hazard. 
Parkinson argued that any effective  
resolution authority must be able to 
separate a failing firm’s systemically im-
portant businesses from the nonessen-
tial ones. However, the largest financial 
firms often have very complex legal 
structures that can include thousands 
of subsidiaries and other legal entities, 
many with intra-company dependencies. 
This makes it extremely challenging to 
isolate the systemically important busi-
nesses. One proposed method to allevi-
ate these challenges is to force SIFIs to 
prepare “living wills” that outline how 
to wind down their operations. These 
plans should require detailed tracking 
of counterparty and creditor linkages 
and explicit operational guidelines and 
alternative solutions for running the 
businesses. The living wills would also 
provide some incentive to firms to sim-
plify their structures, potentially reducing 
instability within the system. 
In addition, Parkinson emphasized that 
SIFIs should avoid being vulnerable to 
runs on short-term funding. Reforms 
should include stricter regulation of  
liquidity risk, he said, in order to steady 
firms’ financial position. Still, Parkinson 
said, “it is critical that the government 
has strong emergency stabilization author-
ities that enable it to provide liquidity 
or facilitate the provision of private  
sector liquidity to the system.”
Finally, Parkinson contended that reforms 
must improve transparency and reduce 
interconnectedness among firms to im-
prove financial stability. One possibility 
would be to set a concentration limit on 
single-firm credit exposures relative to 
regulatory capital. In addition, standard-
ized OTC derivatives could be placed 
into a well-regulated clearinghouse, which 
would act as a central counterparty to 
each contract. Simultaneously, capital 
requirements could be increased on  
SIFIs that enter into any contracts that 
are not centrally cleared. 
De Rato spoke about Spain’s experience 
in the financial crisis and that country’s 
regulatory approach. He highlighted 
Spain’s efforts to implement countercy-
clical loan-loss provisions (i.e., funds 
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set aside as an allowance for bad loans) 
to better withstand downturns. Addition-
ally, he noted that in Spain, securitized 
products were transparent and noncom-
plex and that these products remained 
on the balance sheet. For the most part, 
Spanish financial institutions had avoided 
toxic assets from the U.S. These factors 
contributed to strong capital adequacy 
and reserve levels in Spain, as well as rela-
tively high and sustained profits. Accord-
ingly, government support to the banking 
system as a percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP) was approximately 5% in 
Spain—lower than in the U.S. (7.7%) 
and the UK (27.5%). 
However, Spain had significant exposure 
to the downturn in real estate. Spanish 
housing starts declined precipitously 
despite a relatively moderate adjustment 
in prices. Simultaneously, nonperform-
ing loans grew dramatically, and Spain 
had one of the highest nonperforming 
loan ratios in Europe. Real estate rep-
resents 63% of total loans outstanding, 
and de Rato said he expected one-third 
of those assets to further deteriorate. 
Still, the Spanish banking system can 
cover the losses because of its high cov-
erage ratio from countercyclical reserves 
and strong operational profits. Also, he 
argued that the system is ready for a 
gradual withdrawal of support from 
the European Central Bank (ECB). 
De Rato proposed a two-tier approach 
to focus, first, on strengthening financial 
institutions’ individual resilience and, 
second, on minimizing systemic risks and 
reducing procyclical movements in credit 
markets. He warned that new regulations 
must maintain a delicate equilibrium. 
On the one hand, too much regulation 
could minimize systemic risk but reduce 
credit growth and profitability. On the 
other hand, too little regulation could 
encourage innovation but increase the 
likelihood of new financial crises. 
Responding to the crisis—regulatory 
reform proposals
Speakers on another key panel offered 
specific reforms they thought necessary 
to help avoid or mitigate future financial 
crises. This panel consisted of Philipp 
Hartmann from the European Central 
Bank; Diana Hancock from the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System; H. Rodgin Cohen of Sullivan 
and Cromwell LLP; and Viral Acharya 
from New York University’s Stern School 
of Business. Hartmann explained that 
the goal of macroprudential supervision 
and regulation is to identify and contain 
systemic risk. According to the ECB, 
systemic risk occurs when “financial in-
stability becomes so widespread that it 
impairs the functioning of the financial 
system to the point that economic 
growth and welfare suffer materially.” 
The sources and transmission mecha-
nisms of this risk can encompass all com-
ponents of the financial system, including 
intermediaries, markets, and infra-
structure. In addition, there are differ-
ent forms of systemic risk, Hartmann 
noted, which are contagion, unraveling 
of imbalances, and aggregate shocks. 
In a European Union proposal,  
Hartmann explained, the macropru-
dential supervisor would identify systemic 
risks early on and make policy recom-
mendations to a microprudential au-
thority on how to alleviate the emerging 
risks. The macroprudential supervisor 
would be supported by the ECB, and 
the microprudential authority would 
house the regulators of the banking, 
financial markets, and insurance indus-
tries, which enforce policy. To effective-
ly monitor risk, the macroprudential 
supervisor needs relevant market intel-
ligence on financial innovations, statis-
tical data, and analytical models for 
each form of systemic risk.
Hartmann highlighted some of the ex-
isting models for systemic risk. For con-
tagion risk, supervisors can use contagion 
spillover models, which simulate how 
an individual SIFI’s failure would affect 
the system. For unraveling of imbalances, 
supervisors can use early warning signal 
models, which incorporate macroeco-
nomic measures, such as credit-to-GDP 
ratios or systemwide leverage ratios. For 
aggregate shocks, supervisors can simu-
late various scenarios, using a financial 
stress index, such as the ECB’s Composite 
Indicator of Systemic Stress. This indi-
cator allows the ECB to aggregate data 
from all components of the financial 
system, give weight to the data, and pro-
duce a normalized measure of financial 
stress. Although good progress has 
been made in modeling systemic risk, 
Hartmann emphasized that the concept 
is highly complex and more work is 
needed to understand the transmission 
mechanisms.  
Hancock discussed a proposal that  
attempts to augment current capital 
regulation in order to limit future finan-
cial crises. Basic capital requirements 
reduce, but do not eliminate, the need 
for reserves in the event of a crisis. There-
fore, she proposed “financial-stability-
based prompt corrective action,” which 
she described as a “hierarchical defense 
structure for mitigating systemic risks.” 
It employs a series of capital buffers, in-
cluding common equity and contingent 
capital arrangements, and a systemic 
event trigger that would convert all con-
tingent capital instruments to common 
equity; SIFIs would be required to replen-
ish their contingent capital.
Contingent capital contracts provide a 
pre-specified form and amount of capi-
tal, conditional upon the realization of 
a trigger event. The trigger may be 
based on bank capital levels, macroeco-
nomic stress indexes, or a composite 
financial stress index. The contingent 
capital would act as a privately provided form of insurance against extreme 
events by increasing loss absorption  
capacity and reducing the need for 
firms to deleverage and engage in fire 
sales. This would help the system avoid 
the feedback effects that aggravate 
panics. The proposal could mitigate 
systemic risk, especially if coupled with 
a resolution authority for BHCs and non-
bank financial intermediaries, and would 
improve financial stability ex ante, re-
ducing the likelihood of future panics.
Cohen argued that the single most im-
portant regulatory reform would be the 
creation of a resolution authority for 
SIFIs. The bailouts in the recent crisis 
exposed taxpayers to severe losses, and 
created competitive inequities that ex-
acerbated moral hazard among SIFIs. 
An effective resolution authority could 
mitigate these problems and improve 
overall market confidence ex ante. To 
have an effective resolution regime, he 
argued that taxpayers should incur no 
losses and that creditors must be exposed 
to losses. 
One of the key components of an  
orderly resolution process is an effective 
means to deal with creditor and coun-
terparty claims. Cohen emphasized that 
it is imperative to deal with these claims 
quickly to minimize adverse effects on 
the system. He suggested that the reso-
lution authority could promptly make 
payments to creditors based on a  
conservative estimate of the failed in-
stitution’s ultimate recovery—similar to 
what the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation currently does. However, 
he said that these payments would be 
subject to clawback mechanisms to pro-
tect taxpayers in case the estimated rate 
of recovery proved to be greater than 
the realized rate. If there were still  
deficits following the clawbacks, Cohen 
said that the authority could assess an 
ex post fee against other SIFIs.
Finally, Cohen argued that a truly effec-
tive resolution regime for SIFIs requires 
a comprehensive international frame-
work. This framework must consist at a 
minimum of a basic and binding struc-
ture that delineates cross-country resolu-
tion authority for the holding company, 
bank, and various subsidiaries of the SIFI. 
He also emphasized the need to establish 
in advance how the payout to creditors 
across countries would be structured.  
Acharya discussed a method for mea-
suring firm-specific systemic risk contri-
butions and how these measurements 
could be used. While current financial 
regulations focus on limiting firm-level 
risk, restricting the risk of each bank does 
not necessarily reduce the risk of the 
entire system. Acharya said the challenge 
is therefore to measure ex ante the firms’ 
contribution to systemic risk and force 
firms to factor this externality into their 
business decisions. 
In this model, systemic risk is defined 
as the risk that a crisis occurs and the 
financial system becomes undercapital-
ized. An individual firm’s contribution 
is defined as its systemic expected short-
fall (SES). Acharya used a number of 
empirical methods to estimate a firm’s 
potential contribution to systemic risk 
before the crisis and to see how this 
measure relates to how the firm actually 
fared during the crisis. The results show 
that the ex ante risk measure (SES) pre-
dicts ex post crisis losses and capital 
shortages; i.e., the method did predict 
which firms contributed the most to the 
crisis. He argued that the SES measure-
ment could be used to determine taxes 
on SIFIs for their potential contribution 
to systemic risk. This would encourage 
SIFIs to account for the risk they impose 
on the financial system.
Conclusion
Congress has recently passed a financial 
reform bill. Many of the components of 
that bill center on the issues discussed 
in these two Bank Structure Conference 
panels. Importantly, the legislation leaves 
many of the details to be worked out by 
the regulatory authorities. The 47th 
annual Bank Structure Conference will 
be held May 4–6, 2011. The theme is 
still being finalized, but there is little 
doubt that the issues surrounding the 
financial crisis and resulting regulatory 
reform will be on the agenda. 